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Abstract—Personal Network (PN) is a new concept utilizing 
pervasive computing to meet the needs of the user. As PNs edge 
closer towards reality, security becomes an important concern 
since any vulnerability in the system will limit its practical use. In 
this paper we introduce a security architecture designed for PNs. 
Our aim is to use secure but lightweight mechanisms suitable for 
resource constrained devices and wireless communication. We 
support pair-wise keys for secure cluster formation and use 
group keys for securing intra-cluster communication. In order to 
analyze the performance of our proposed mechanisms, we carry 
out simulations using ns-2. The results show that our mechanisms 
have a low overhead in terms of delay and energy consumption. 
Keywords-Personal Networks; secure communication; security 
agent, group key; key management 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The goal of our security architecture is to provide users of 
Personal Networks (PNs) [1] with a reliable communication 
platform to access their services. A PN comprises a core 
consisting of a PAN (Personal Area Network) which can be 
extended on demand to include other devices belonging to the 
user, both in his vicinity and those at remote locations such as 
the home or office. This transparent extension of the PAN will 
physically be made via infrastructure-based networks such as 
an organizations intranet, other ad-hoc networks, etc. Devices 
belonging to the PN can have one or more wireless interfaces 
such as Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11, UWB and ZigBee. These 
devices are expected to be mobile and their membership status 
as well as their physical location within the PN can change at 
any time. Fig. 1 outlines the PN architecture developed in the 
QoS for PN@Home project [2]. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Clusters in a Personal Network 
Providing security for PN devices is a major challenge 
since the majority of current security algorithms were designed 
for powerful workstations and are not practical for resource 
constrained devices. As a result, often for the sake of feasibility 
and efficiency, security is sacrificed. We believe that as 
technology advances and devices become more ubiquitous, 
strong security is necessary for a viable system. As discussed in 
[5], [6] and [7] the limited computational and energy resources 
of many PN devices imply that any proposed security solution 
must be simple and lightweight in order that it does not create a 
performance bottleneck of its own. Therefore our system is 
based on symmetric cryptographic primitives where public key 
cryptography is optional and only used between two parties 
when mutually agreed.  
Since energy is the scarcest resource in our system, our 
security mechanisms must be frugal in their power 
consumption. We would like to minimize the security overhead 
in data packets and also restrict key management activities in 
order to conserve power. Fortunately since devices from a 
particular PN share the same owner, we believe that it is 
sufficient for PN devices to demonstrate group membership of 
a cluster rather than their individual identity. Such a restriction 
improves on system efficiency by using a shared group key 
(henceforth called the cluster key) to verify cluster membership 
instead of as many keys as members in the cluster. It reduces 
the overhead associated with key management such as the 
amount of processing required, the number of messages 
exchanged, authentication delay and storage space.  
As illustrated in Fig. 1, personal devices initially organize 
themselves in the form of clusters. A cluster is defined as a 
collection of personal devices which can communicate amongst 
each other without using any non-personal devices. In order to 
operate as a cluster some devices perform additional 
organizational tasks. Fig. 1 shows two roles; that of a master 
node and a cluster head [4]. In this paper we define a new role, 
that of a security agent (Section III.A). Our proposed 
architecture requires each cluster to have one device 
functioning as a security agent; however there is no restriction 
to any other role that such a device may serve.  
This remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section II describes related work; Section III introduces some 
basic architectural concepts and Section IV explains the 
security requirements of our system. Section V describes how 
devices form clusters while Section VI explains key 
management, including device authentication/eviction and key 
updates. Section VII analyses the performance of our proposed 
mechanisms in ns-2 and Section VIII concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The only PN specific security architecture we know of is 
the work done in MAGNET [15] [16]. For a device to join a 
cluster it needs to have a long-term security association with 
any one neighboring clustered device. Cluster merge and splits 
do not post a challenge as there is no centralized management 
such as a security agent. The main weakness of the MAGNET 
approach is its large overhead. Since traffic sent between 
neighbors is encrypted using pair-wise keys, the system uses 
hop by hop encryption for both unicast and broadcast traffic. A 
large number of messages must be exchanged for a device to 
establish the required security associations with all its 
neighbors, particularly during high mobility. Our approach of 
using a shared key reduces the overhead of key management 
significantly. Additionally, messages no longer need to be re-
encrypted at each hop.  
The SPINS [5] set of protocols are designed for sensor 
networks where the network topology is rather different from 
that in a PN. Networks form around a base station where sensor 
nodes establish a routing tree, with the base station at the root. 
Devices establish a master key with the base station upon 
introduction to the network, and use that key to derive two new 
keys for protecting unicast traffic between the base station and 
themselves. Routing is much simpler since devices are only 
required to have a path towards the base station. A secure 
routing tree is created (for traffic to the base station) by having 
the base station send routing beacons protected using μTesla. 
Lastly, since battery replacement is designed to delete all the 
keys, there is no key management.  
TinySec [6] is the first implemented link layer security 
protocol for sensor networks. As with our proposed 
mechanisms, it uses a shared symmetric key which is used by 
senders to first encrypt the data and then apply the MAC. The 
receiver uses the MAC to verify that the packet was not 
modified in transit. The TinySec protocol is not a complete 
architecture in the sense that it does not cover aspects such as 
key management and device discovery etc. However, the 
TinySec protocol has been well analyzed (and designed) in the 
context of sensor devices, especially related to its energy and 
communication overhead.  
III. ARCHITECTURAL CONCEPTS 
Our approach is based on establishing a line of defense 
between the PN and the rest of the world by distinguishing 
between cluster members (trusted) and non-members (un-
trusted). The semi-independent nature of clusters coupled with 
the fact that inter-cluster connectivity is not always guaranteed 
(even when possible it is infeasible to maintain it at all times 
for key synchronizations etc.) motivates our separation of trust 
at the cluster level. 
Although we use group authentication for increasing 
efficiency, we appreciate that key compromise can have serious 
consequences since there is no easy way to uniquely identify 
the attacker. Unfortunately there are no ideal solutions for 
source authentication in group communication, especially in 
the case of multiple senders. One possibility is to use public 
key cryptography, but it is costly to generate and verify digital 
signatures on every packet. There exist schemes with the 
source authenticity allowed by public key cryptography but 
without the performance penalty [8] [9] [10], however they 
have their drawbacks. 
A. Security Agents 
The security agent authenticates new devices that join the 
cluster and initiates the periodic cluster key updates. It also 
periodically broadcasts cluster advertisements (CAs) which are 
used by other devices to discover the cluster. Additionally, the 
security agent is able to evict short-term members on demand 
and is responsible for setting the cluster policy which lets 
devices joining the cluster know about various cluster 
parameters like the frequency of cluster advertisements and key 
updates, and the length of certain timers etc. We decided to use 
a centralized mechanism for cluster authentication to ease 
management, reduce the number of security associations that 
need to be established and to limit the vulnerability of the 
system to compromised devices. 
In terms of security agent functionality, we also define two 
new classifications of devices. Some devices have the 
capabilities to function as security agents and others do not. 
When not connected to other devices, a Security Agent 
Capable (SAC) device will function as a security agent and is 
thus considered a special form of a cluster which only contains 
itself. Security Agent Incapable (SAI) devices, unable to act as 
security agents, do not constitute a cluster when alone and need 
to join existing clusters. We expect SAI devices to be less 
sophisticated and typically not useful by themselves. They are 
designed to be used in conjunction with other smarter devices, 
when networked together as a cluster. 
B. Cluster Key 
The cluster key introduced previously is used to guard 
against unauthorized access that can degrade the quality of 
service for PN users. The cluster key is randomly generated for 
each time period, and given to new members by the security 
agent after a successful authentication. Once devices receive 
the cluster key they are able to take part in intra-cluster 
communication. The cluster key is periodically refreshed by the 
security agent and distributed to all existing cluster members. 
Devices append a MAC (message authentication code) 
calculated using the cluster key to all cluster traffic that they 
generate. Consequently any subsequent device receiving the 
traffic can verify that it was generated by a trusted device and 
not modified in transit by any un-trusted device. Any packet 
with a source address of the cluster that does not have a valid 
MAC is dropped. The security provided to cluster traffic by the 
communication infrastructure is therefore group message 
integrity and authentication. 
As appending the MAC increases the original packet size 
and thus the communication overhear, it should not be too 
large. Conventional security protocols use overly conservative 
security parameters, having MAC size of 8 or 16 bytes [6]. A 
larger MAC reduces the chance of an adversary blindly 
guessing the appropriate code but correspondingly costs more 
to transmit. Reference [6] validates using a 4 byte MAC and 
explains how it is not detrimental in the context of low 
bandwidth links. 
Earlier we pointed out the performance advantages of 
having devices authenticate themselves as part of the trusted 
group. However it becomes more difficult to identify any 
malicious behavior from inside the cluster as the attacker can 
alter his source address to that of another cluster device and 
still authenticate as part of the cluster. Even though such 
malicious behavior (typically due to device compromise) will 
be rare, it is something that can conceivably happen. In order to 
keep our mechanisms lightweight we do not attempt to identify 
malicious behavior of trusted devices. However our design 
allows the user to blacklist any suspect devices from the PN. 
IV. SECURE COMMUNICATION 
In this section we look at the security properties of our 
system. In order to protect the communication infrastructure 
and secure applications, devices require packet authentication. 
Therefore they will not accept invalid messages injected by an 
adversary.  
A. Message Integrity and Authentication 
Since every new cluster key is encrypted using the existing 
cluster key (Section VI.A), we limit further direct use of the 
cluster key in order to minimize its exposure to attack. If the 
cluster key were to get compromised then there is no forward 
secrecy because the attacker can use it to decrypt further re-key 
packets. Therefore the key used to generate the MAC (Kmac) is 
derived from the cluster key using a globally known one way 
hash function. This way we maintain forward secrecy because 
even if Kmac is compromised it can not be used to derive the 
existing or the future cluster keys. Similarly, backward secrecy 
is also guaranteed since only the security of the current session 
is compromised. 
B. Encryption 
As the aim of our security architecture is the dependability 
of the communication infrastructure and not confidentiality, 
messages are not automatically encrypted. Moreover, because 
encryption/decryption consumes power and increases latency, 
it is difficult to justify confidentiality as a basic requirement for 
all traffic. Most applications that require confidentiality already 
encrypt their traffic end-to-end, so duplicating the same 
functionality at the lower layers is not efficient.  
If necessary, data confidentiality can be supported at the 
link layer by encrypting sensitive messages with an encryption 
key (Kencr). Similarly to Kmac, the encryption key is also derived 
from the cluster key using a globally known one-way 
transformation. This is also done so as to limit as much as 
possible the direct use of the cluster key. 
V. CLUSTERING 
Clustering, the process by which all PN devices within each 
others transmission range connect to form a cluster, is an 
integral part of a PN. Therefore one aim of all devices is to 
discover others around them that belong to their own PN. In 
principle, this is done by listening for cluster advertisements 
(CAs).  
As mentioned before, SAI devices are envisioned to operate 
only as part of clusters and to be less sophisticated (a good 
example is that of a sensor). These devices can be left powered 
up for extended periods either purposely or mistakenly by the 
owner of the PN. We do not want such otherwise idle devices 
to spend precious energy continuously advertising themselves 
to non-existing neighbors. Clusters on the other hand, as shown 
by their interconnected state, are more active in nature. 
Therefore, only clusters are allowed to advertise, while un-
clustered devices periodically wake up to listen for such 
advertisements. When an un-clustered device receives a cluster 
advertisement from a cluster belonging to its own PN, it will 
attempt to authenticate itself to, and join that cluster 
Cluster advertisements are periodically generated and 
broadcasted by the security agent. Other cluster members re-
broadcast non-duplicate advertisements, in effect “propagating” 
them to the edged of the cluster like a ripple on a pond. The 
periodicity of cluster advertisements and the decision on which 
devices take part in propagating these advertisements depends 
on the cluster policy at the security agent. Each member 
receives a copy of this policy when it joins the cluster. 
A. PN and Cluster Address 
We imagine the world to be full of wireless devices, 
belonging to a multitude of users. Therefore we need an 
efficient mechanism for PN devices to distinguish between 
those belonging to their own PN from all the rest. This is 
because we do not want devices from one user to continuously 
try to connect to others of different users and failing, wasting 
precious energy in the process. Therefore we assume the 
existence of a PN address, calculated randomly over a 
sufficiently large space so as to reduce the possibility of 
collisions. Devices learn of their PN address during the initial 
imprinting phase. Although the exact type of this address is 
beyond the scope of this document, it is conceivable that it 
could belong to either the IP domain, or a new layer between 
the IP and the MAC layers. Devices check the PN addresses of 
any cluster advertisement they receive, and only attempt to 
authenticate with clusters with similar PN addresses. 
Additionally, we also assume the existence of a cluster 
address so cluster members can distinguish between traffic 
from inside and outside the cluster. The cluster address is 
derived from the physical address of security agent, and should 
therefore be unique. Cluster advertisements include both the 
PN address and the cluster address.  
B. Cluster Dynamics 
Cluster advertisements do more than just advertise the 
existence of a cluster to non-members; they also let cluster 
members know that their cluster is “alive”. A cluster that is 
alive has a functioning security agent and can therefore grow 
by adding new members. Conversely a zombie cluster is one 
that has lost its security agent (but has a valid cluster key). 
Devices belonging to a zombie cluster can still communicate 
securely with each other, but the cluster can not grow because 
there is no security agent to authenticate new members.  
Devices believe they have lost connectivity with the 
security agent (and that they are part of a zombie cluster) when 
they miss “i” number of sequential cluster advertisements. The 
value of “i” is set by the security agent of the cluster and given 
to each member (as a part of the cluster policy) when it joins 
the cluster. Devices that believe they are part of a zombie 
cluster take steps to reorganize themselves. If possible, devices 
try to join other clusters belonging to their PN. SAC devices 
may also choose to leave a zombie cluster to create one of their 
own. Zombie clusters can only be resuscitated by the return and 
the resulting cluster advertisement generated by the original 
security agent. Since each security agent stores some state 
information about its cluster, it is not possible to recover from 
the loss of a security agent by re-election, only by creating a 
new cluster. 
In the absence of a security agent, as there is no one to 
update the cluster key of the zombie cluster, it will eventually 
expire. If devices have not been able to join new clusters in the 
meantime, when this happens, they can no longer communicate 
amongst each other. SAI devices enter the orphan state, where 
they wait indefinitely to join other clusters while SAC devices 
form their own clusters. 
C. Authenticating Cluster Advertisments 
Like other cluster traffic, cluster advertisements are also 
protected by a MAC. Attackers cannot generate verifiable 
cluster advertisements unless they possess the valid cluster key. 
Furthermore they can not replay older advertisements because 
these contain a sequence number and duplicate advertisements 
are discarded by cluster devices. However compromised 
devices can generate illicit cluster advertisements with valid 
sequence numbers that can be verified by other cluster devices. 
The only possible aim of such an attack would be to hide the 
absence of the security agent from other cluster devices, 
possibly to stop them from abandoning the existing cluster. 
However this attack can not be successful indefinitely because 
the attacker can not create a verifiable re-key packet (Section 
VI.A). Additionally the negative affect of such an attack is 
limited since the attacker can launch much more deadly attacks 
such as polluting the routing information etc.  
Since devices have no way of verifying advertisements 
from clusters to which they do not belong, attackers can easily 
generate fictitious cluster advertisements. However as devices 
always perform mutual authentication this is at best a denial of 
service attack. Devices can protect themselves against such 
false advertisements by limiting the rate at which they attempt 
to re-authenticate after recent failed attempts. 
VI. KEY MANAGEMENT 
During device authentication the security agent establishes 
a secure channel, verifies the supplicant device’s credentials, 
and downloads the cluster key and policy to the supplicant. The 
cluster key is then periodically refreshed with the period whose 
duration depends on the security level required. In general, re-
key messages can be sent unicast or broadcasted for more 
efficient distribution. We rejected the unicast approach because 
it is inefficient and does not utilize the properties of the 
broadcast medium. 
Our approach also implements an efficient mechanism to 
evict short-term cluster members. Short-term cluster members 
are basically foreign devices that have been granted cluster 
membership for a limited duration. These could be devices 
belonging to friends and family or even rented devices that 
should be evicted from the cluster before returning. Cluster 
devices that belong to the user’s own PN are considered long-
term members. Evicting long-term members is a rare 
occurrence which for example needs to be done if a device gets 
sold or compromised. In such a case, the device’s long-term 
security associations with the PN will be eliminated, followed 
by the security agent dismantling the existing cluster. When the 
cluster re-forms the evicted PN device will not have any long-
term security associations to be able to authenticate itself. 
A. Cluster Key Updates 
Even though all cluster traffic is protected using a MAC, 
we believe that re-key messages containing the new cluster key 
require an additional level of security. This is necessary in 
order to reduce the impact of compromised devices which can 
otherwise hijack the cluster by pretending to be the security 
agent and updating the cluster key. Therefore broadcast re-key 
messages are protected using source authentication so that they 
can not be forged by compromised devices. Finally, to ensure 
confidentiality, the new key is distributed encrypted using the 
existing cluster key. 
As we are broadcasting the re-key messages, there is no 
way for the security agent to ensure that all members receive 
the new cluster key. We can imagine a solution in which 
members can generate negative acknowledgements when the 
cluster key that they are using is about to expire and they have 
not received the new key. However devices can not send 
negative acknowledgements if the re-key is being done ahead 
of schedule, for example, to evict a shot-term member.  Lastly, 
a reliable key update using pair-wise keys and acknowledged 
unicast transmission is possible but significant more costly and 
requires the security agent to have an up-to-date list of all 
cluster members.  
Our re-key mechanism has two goals. The first goal is to 
ensure a reliable distribution of re-key messages to all cluster 
members. The second goal is to enable cluster members to 
verify the source of these messages. In order to do so we need a 
reliable broadcast authentication mechanism based on 
symmetric cryptography. The broadcast authentication 
mechanism we use has some similarities with μTesla [5], but 
ported to the peculiarities of our system. Notably we do not 
want to use clock synchronization, even the “loose” clock 
synchronization required by μTesla.  
μTesla brings about asymmetry by a delayed disclosure of 
symmetric keys. It divides time into equal intervals, assigning a 
different key to each interval. All packets generated by the 
source within a specific time interval use the key assigned to 
that interval. Messages are then broadcasted with a MAC 
generated using the secret key, which will be disclosed at a 
specific time in the future. When the receiver receives a 
message, it confirms that the key has not been disclosed, and 
then buffers the message. The message is later authenticated 
when the corresponding key is publicly disclosed.  
Although our solution is also based on a delayed disclosure 
of symmetric keys (hash chain values), it is not tied to time 
intervals but rather to each round of the re-key algorithm. In 
our approach, re-key messages are protected with a MAC 
calculated using a symmetric key (hash chain value) related to 
that round of re-keying. In order to ensure the reliable delivery 
of a re-key message, it is encapsulated within “i” consecutive 
cluster advertisements; where “i” was defined as the number of 
sequential cluster advertisements that are missed by a device 
before it believes it has lost connectivity with the security 
agent. Note that the “complete” cluster advertisement carrying 
the encapsulated re-key message is protected with the MAC 
generated using Kmac. This means that even though re-key 
messages cannot be authenticated till the corresponding hash 
chain value is released, external attackers can not launch 
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against the cluster. This is 
because they cannot generate valid cluster advertisements 
encapsulating the false re-key messages! 
The hash chain value corresponding to this re-key message 
is then publicly released in the next “i” sequential cluster 
advertisements. As above, any device which has connectivity 
with the security agent should successfully receive this hash 
chain value. The value is then verified against the authenticated 
hash chain value given to all devices by the security agent 
when they joined the cluster. Thus re-key messages cannot be 
successfully attacked, even by compromised devices, because 
nobody but the security agent knows an undisclosed authentic 
hash chain value. 
The cluster advertisement which includes the hash chain 
value being disclosed is not source authenticated, and is 
therefore open to attack by compromised devices. However, if 
such a device changes the original hash chain value (and 
updates the MAC of the cluster advertisement) then the 
disclosed value will not match the re-key message. 
B. Evicting Short-Term Members 
In order to evict short-term members the new cluster key 
can not be distributed by encrypting it in a KEK (Key 
Encrypting Key) that is known to both long and short-term 
members.  Therefore unlike PN devices which are given the 
actual cluster key when they join the cluster, foreign devices 
are only given the derived cluster keys Kmac and Kencr. 
Although this allows them to create a valid MAC for 
authentication they are unable to decrypt the broadcasted re-
key messages meant for long-term members that contain the 
updated cluster key. The security agent simultaneously updates 
the derived keys at the foreign device using unicast 
transmission. This does not create a performance drawback 
because the number of such short-term members is limited. The 
re-key messages meant for long-term members are for a much 
broader audience and are broadcasted for increased efficiency. 
Consequently, when a short-term member needs to be 
removed from the cluster, the security agent updates the cluster 
key of all long-term members using the mechanism described 
in Section VI.A. It will then change the keys of the other short-
term members (except the device that is being evicted) using 
secure unicast transmission. 
C. Device Authentication 
Earlier we stated that devices wishing to join a cluster need 
to authenticate with the security agent of that cluster. We also 
said that members of a cluster only forward authenticated 
cluster traffic. This implies that for supplicant devices to 
authenticate with a cluster, they need to be within the 
transmission range of the security agent (belonging to the 
cluster they wish to join). Similarly, for two clusters to merge 
together, the two security agents also need to be within each 
others transmission range. Such a restriction on the 
extensibility of the cluster is not practical. We would like 
clusters to extend with devices that are within the range of even 
peripheral cluster members. Similarly, two clusters should be 
able to merge when their periphery overlaps and not only when 
the transmission range of the two security agents overlaps. To 
that end, cluster members enable IEEE 802.1X based port 
authentication. 
As a result, besides authenticated cluster traffic (i.e. traffic 
protected using Kmac) cluster members also accept 
unauthenticated EAP [11] requests which are forwarded to the 
security agent for authentication. As a result supplicant devices 
do not need to be within the communication range of the 
security agent to be able to authenticate themselves. Although 
allowing clustered devices to forward unauthenticated EAP 
requests make them vulnerable to DoS attacks, clustered 
devices can protect themselves by limiting the rate at which 
they forward such requests. Predictably, devices that are not 
part of a cluster do not forward EAP requests. 
The mechanisms we propose for use have some important 
differences with IEEE 802.1X. For instance, after a successful 
authentication the supplicant no longer maintains any 
relationship with the authenticator.  Additionally, our 
mechanisms allow complete clusters to merge instead of just 
permitting individual devices to join a cluster. When clusters 
merge, the authentication takes place between the two security 
agents using a secure tunnel and any confidential information 
exchanged is not visible to the intermediaries who are just 
forwarding the EAP messages. A detailed specification of the 
new EAP protocol is beyond the scope of this document. 
For a cluster that is extended with a single device the 
process is simple. The new device configures itself according 
to the cluster policy and begins to use Kmac to take part in 
cluster communication. When two clusters merge, the security 
agent of one cluster needs to step down. This is done using a 
simple check to see which security agent has a higher “weight”. 
Security agents calculate their weight, a numerical value that 
expresses their current status keeping in mind device 
parameters like mobility, battery level, number of devices in 
the cluster etc. When two clusters merge the yielding security 
agent needs to update all the devices in its cluster with the 
information it has received. As with cluster key updates, this 
must be done using source authentication. Therefore the 
mechanisms used are the same as that for re-keying. 
D. Pre-Authentication 
In order for two devices to authenticate each other they 
must have an existing security association, the creation of 
which precedes the actual authentication. As of now we have 
assumed that such an association already exists between the 
security agent and the device it is authenticating. Since security 
associations require some work to set up, we would like to 
reduce the total number of security associations required by our 
system. Our model assumes that all PN devices have a security 
association with the core node, a PN wide master node. This 
association is formed during the imprinting process, which 
each device goes through when it becomes a member of the 
PN. In order to reduce the number of security associations 
between devices and security agents, security agents can 
forward the authentication requests of unknown devices to the 
core node. The core node will authenticate the device and also 
assist in creating a long term security association between the 
security agent and the device. Therefore in the future the 
security agent will not have to proxy the authentication 
requests. 
If connectivity with the core node is not available, or there 
is no security association between the authenticating device and 
the core node then the security agent can give the user an 
option of authenticating using manual intervention (like 
Bluetooth pairing). 
VII. SIMULATIONS 
The objective of our simulations was to quantify the cost of 
initial cluster formation and to optimize its performance by 
examining the effect of different parameters. In this first set of 
simulations, we study the formation of one cluster with one 
security agent. We do not (yet) look at key management, 
cluster merging or effects of mobility. 
We simulate a CSMA/CD (802.11b [12]) wireless ad-hoc 
network with the wireless mobility extensions in ns-2.29 [13]. 
The transmission range of each device is 10m and simulations 
are carried out till all devices have authenticated with the 
security agent (to form a cluster). When not specified 
otherwise, the simulation uses default ns link layer parameters, 
for instance a RTS/CTS threshold of 0 bytes. Setting a higher 
RTS/CTS threshold value produced errors [14]; therefore the 
default value was used in all simulations. All our simulation 
scenarios use a grid size of either 25 x 25m or 50 x 50m, which 
correspond to average inter device distances of approximately 2 
and 5 hops respectively. For each scenario (each row in Tables 
I and Table III) we generated 50 connected graphs with random 
device positions.  The simulation of each of the 50 graphs was 
performed 10 times using a random seed. The results are 
summarized in the corresponding tables. 
The scenarios differ in their grid size, the number of 
devices and/or the value of certain PN specific simulation 
parameters. The performance in each scenario is judged by the 
average time and the total transmissions at the MAC layer 
required for all the devices to complete authentication with the 
security agent. This gives a quantitative idea of the cost in 
terms of clustering delay and energy consumption. Ideally we 
would like to compare the security overhead to data traffic, but 
that can vary depending on the amount of data traffic.  
TABLE I.  SIMULATION RESULTS USING DEFAULT PARAMETERS 
Grid Size 
(m) 
No. of 
devices 
Avg. 
Time (s) 
Avg. 
Bytes (k) 
Avg. SA 
Bytes (k) 
25 x 25 5 1.3 35 12 
25 x 25 10 2.8 108 26 
25 x 25 20 4.0 244 54 
25 x 25 30 4.4 353 83 
25 x 25 40 5.0 461 111 
25 x 25 50 5.3 561 140 
50 x50 20 6.8 424 54 
50 x 50 50 10.1 1378 138 
TABLE II.  PN SIMULATION PARAMENTERS AND THEIR DEFAULT VALUES 
Simulation Parameter Default Value 
CA period 1s 
CA packet size  44 bytes (incl. 4 bytes MAC, 20 bytes IP) 
EAP packet size 534 bytes (incl. 4 bytes MAC, 20 bytes IP) 
EAP Round Trips 4 
EAP timeout  2.5s 
Auth. timeout 20s 
Auth. delay 0s 
Processing delay of 
CA/EAP packets Average of 10ms 
 
The results in Table I are achieved using the default PN 
simulation parameters of Table II. When comparing the sixth 
and the eighth simulations of Table I, we see that the extra 
number of hops (avg. of 2 vs. 5) has a significant effect on the 
total transmission overhead. However, since the total number 
of devices authenticating with the security agent is the same in 
both scenarios the transmissions overhead of the security agent 
is identical.  
Fig. 2 illustrates one simulation instance of a grid size of 25 
x 25m with 20 devices. At time 10ms the security agent (SA) 
transmits the first cluster advertisement (CA). Every 
unauthenticated device that hears this CA will attempt to 
authenticate with the SA, i.e. all the devices within the dark 
grey circle around the SA. In the best case when there are no 
collisions at the link layer, all unauthenticated devices within 
the first hop will successfully authenticate with the SA. At 0.5s 
in Fig. 2 we see that 6 devices have completed authentication 
with the SA. Once authenticated, devices are able to validate 
the MAC on any future CAs they receive, and will therefore 
forward such CAs. In the best case we can expect devices 
which are two hops away from the SA to authenticate with the 
SA after the second CA is transmitted. As the default CA 
period is 1 second during the clustering phase, we see 5 more 
devices have authenticated at 1.5s in Fig. 2. The value of 1 
second for the CA period is only meant to be used during the 
clustering phase to reduce the clustering delay and not through 
the lifetime of the cluster. At 2.5s, we see that two devices in 
spite of being within the transmission range of the third CA, are 
unauthenticated. This is due to collisions at the link layer; 
either they did not receive the CA, or the EAP packet they sent 
got lost. The chosen EAP authentication mechanism is 
simulated based on two parameters, the average size of the 
EAP packet and the number of round trips necessary to 
complete the authentication (default values in Table II). If an 
EAP message does not get a reply within the “EAP timeout”
                    
                   
Figure 2.  Simulation instance with a grid size of 25 x 25m and 20 devices 
 
    
 
Figure 3.  CDF for simulations with a 25 x 25m grid and 20 devices Figure 4.  Number of devices vs. clustering delay for a 25 x 25m grid 
  
period of 2.5s, it is retransmitted. That is why the two 
unauthenticated devices (which received their CA at ≈2s) only 
try again at ≈4.5s, and we see that they have successfully 
authenticated by 5.5s. Lastly, if the entire authentication does 
not complete within the “Auth timeout” period, devices give up 
and will only try again the next time they receive a CA 
For each scenario of Table I, the time taken for devices to 
authenticate with the security agent (although strongly 
correlated with the CA period) varies across different 
simulation runs. This is due to the collisions at the link layer. 
Fig. 3 illustrates a CDF of time taken by devices to authenticate 
with the SA. The graph is compiled from data of all the 
simulations carried out for the given scenario i.e. 50 graphs x 
10 runs each. We can see that although the average clustering 
delay for this scenario was 4.0s (Table I), over 60% of the 
devices have authenticated by 1.5s. As expected, new devices 
authenticate in each round of CAs (shown by large hikes at 0s, 
1s, 2s, 3s etc). The small hikes at 2.5s, 3,5 and 4.5s correspond 
to authentications that require retransmission of EAP messages.  
Fig. 4 illustrates how the time needed to complete cluster 
formation varies with the number of devices in the system. We 
can see that the increase is almost linear, likely because the 
benefit of having more devices authenticating per cluster 
advertisement is balanced by delay caused by the increased 
collisions at the link layer.  
TABLE III.  SIMULATION RESULTS FOR A 25 X  25M GRID WITH 50 
DEVICES, USING MODIFIED SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
EAP 
Timeout (s) 
Auth. 
Delay (ms) 
Avg. 
Time (s) 
Avg. 
Bytes (k) 
Avg. SA 
Bytes (k) 
2.5 0 5.3 561 140 
3.0 0 7.1 573 141 
3.0 30 5.4 562 140 
3.5 0 6.4 566 140 
 
Table III illustrates the effect of tuning the “EAP timeout” 
and the “Auth delay” parameters. The first row corresponds to 
using the default values for the given parameters. In the second 
row, the EAP timeout is increased to 3.0s and as expected the 
clustering delay increases. This is because the system responds 
slower to lost EAP messages. However, when the timeout 
value is increased to 3.5s we see that the performance is better 
than for 3.0s. This is because with an “EAP timeout” of 3s any 
retransmission of EAP messages will happen while CAs are 
being disseminated, thus increasing the chance of collisions. 
We confirm this by observing a performance increase if there is 
a 30ms delay before the authentication phase begins.  
As an optimization, when CAs are disseminated in the 
network, devices create temporary routing table entries to store 
reverse paths towards the SA. As a result, when device forward 
EAP messages to the SA, the complete path to the SA already 
exists and does not need to be discovered. The forward route to 
the sender is created when the first EAP message travels to the 
security agent. As a result, the MAC bytes calculated above do 
not have any routing over head. However, these optimizations 
are derived from the AODV implementation in ns and can only 
work when using AODV as the routing algorithm.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have formulated a security architecture for 
Personal Networks. Since our mechanisms are solely based on 
fast symmetric cryptography, they are applicable to a wide 
variety of device types. Our design takes into account the 
peculiarities of the system, the most constrained of which is 
battery life. In this context we have specified the procedures for 
clustering, the functionality of the security agent, mechanisms 
used for cluster discovery and those for key management. 
Additionally we have carried out simulations to show the 
feasibility of our proposed security mechanisms.  
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